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INTRODUCTION 
1. This is an action under the federal Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization 
Act (“TVPRA”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591, 1595, and Massachusetts General Laws, Chapter 93A 
against Backpage.com, LLC and its principals (“Backpage”) for aiding, supporting, and 
facilitating the sexual exploitation of Plaintiffs Jane Doe No. 1, Jane Doe No. 2, and Jane Doe 
No. 3.  Backpage is a criminal enterprise that owns and operates a global online marketplace that 
derives its revenue principally from illegal commercial sex, including sex with children.  
Defendants operate Backpage.com, a website, as well as other affiliated websites, that were 
intentionally designed to attract advertisements for illegal commercial sex, and that have 
succeeded in attracting more than 80 percent of the market for such advertising nationally.    
2. For years, Defendants have aggressively maintained to the public, law 
enforcement, and the courts that Backpage.com is a neutral forum that has attracted adult content, 
and that it is a mere publisher that cannot be held responsible for any illegal conduct occurring 
on the website.  Indeed, the First Circuit upheld the dismissal of an action against Backpage under 
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Rule 12(b)(6) on the ground, inter alia, that Backpage was not responsible for injuries to children 
trafficked on its website simply because its conduct as a publisher “ma[d]e sex trafficking easier.” 
Doe v. Backpage.com, 817 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 2016).  
3. However, in January 2017, the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations (“Senate Subcommittee”) issued a fifty-three page report that details Backpage’s 
active participation in the illegal commercial sex business occurring on the website.  
Backpage.com’s Knowing Facilitation of Online Sex Trafficking (“2017 Senate Report”) (2017) 
(Ex. A).  After conducting a 20-month investigation into Backpage and its practices and reviewing 
over one million pages of documents, the Senate Subcommittee concluded, inter alia, that 
Backpage knowingly “facilitates prostitution and child sex trafficking” by various means 
described in the report.  Among its most pernicious practices, Backpage systematically employs 
both electronic and manual means to alter language proposing illegal sexual transactions and to 
remove images to “sanitize” the advertisements so that they appear to involve adults rather than 
children.  2017 Senate Report at 2, 3, 16–17 (Ex. A).  The practice of modifying advertisements, 
along with other conduct detailed in the Senate Report, was intended to minimize the risk of law 
enforcement detection of sex trafficking of minors, and thus to grow the advertising volume, 
market share, and profitability of Backpage.com.  The Senate Report detailing Backpage’s 
conduct was supported by 839 pages of internal Backpage communications, corporate financial 
documents, and company policies and guidelines regarding its operations. Appendix of 2017 
Senate Report (“Senate Appendix”).  
4. In March 2018, Congress passed the “Allow States and Victims to Fight Online 
Sex Trafficking Act of 2017” (“FOSTA”), and the President signed it into law on April 11, 2018.  
Pub. L. No. 115-___, ___ Stat. ___ (2018) (codified at, inter alia, 47 U.S.C. § 230).  FOSTA 
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specifically states, among its legislative findings, that Section 230 of the Communications 
Decency Act (“CDA”), 47 U.S.C. § 230, “was never intended to provide legal protection to 
websites that . . . facilitate traffickers in advertising the sale of unlawful sex with sex trafficking 
victims,” and that “websites that promote and facilitate prostitution have been reckless in allowing 
the sale of sex trafficking victims and have done nothing to prevent the trafficking of children and 
victims of force, fraud, and coercion.”  FOSTA § 2(1)-(2).  Accordingly, Congress passed FOSTA 
to “clarify that section 230 of [the CDA] does not prohibit the enforcement against providers and 
users of interactive computer services of Federal and State criminal and civil law relating to 
sexual exploitation or sex trafficking.” Id. pmbl. (emphasis added).  FOSTA amended, inter alia, 
Section 230(e) of the CDA to provide that “[n]othing in this section (other than subsection 
(c)(2)(A)) shall be construed to impair or limit . . . any claim in a civil action brought under section 
1595 of title 18, United States Code, if the conduct underlying the claim constitutes a violation of 
section 1591 of that title.”  Id. § 4(a).  FOSTA also provides that its amendment to Section 230(e) 
“shall apply regardless of whether the conduct alleged occurred, or is alleged to have occurred, 
before, on, or after [FOSTA’s] date of enactment.”  Id. § 4(b).  The effect of FOSTA is to ensure 
that website operators like Backpage can be held civilly liable to their victims for their violations 
of federal criminal law. 
5. In the cases of Jane Doe No. 1, Jane Doe No. 2, and Jane Doe No. 3, Backpage 
knew or had reason to know that the subjects of the advertisements were children at the time they 
were advertised for sale on Backpage.com and its affiliated websites. Yet Backpage intentionally 
facilitated the sale of Plaintiffs for illegal sex by, among other things, altering the content of the 
advertisements offering them for sale to convey the false impression that Plaintiffs were adults.  
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As a result of Backpage’s conduct, the duration and frequency of the exploitation of these children 
was substantially increased.   
6. Plaintiffs therefore bring claims under 18 U.S.C. § 1595, alleging that Defendants 
knowingly benefited from participation in ventures that they knew or should have known violated 
18 U.S.C. § 1591, which prohibits participation in the trafficking of minors for commercial sex.  
Plaintiffs also bring claims under Massachusetts General Laws chapter 93A, alleging that, by 
doctoring advertisements for illegal commercial sex concerning each Plaintiff to convey the false 
impression that the proposed transactions involved adults rather than children, Defendants 
engaged in unfair or deceptive acts or practices, which extended the time period during which 
Plaintiffs were exploited and thus the number of instances in which each of them was raped. 
PARTIES 
7. Plaintiff Jane Doe No. 1, who is currently 18 years old, was 15 years old when she 
was first sold for sex in Massachusetts, New York, Connecticut, New Hampshire and Maine 
through Backpage.com.  She resides in Massachusetts. 
8. Plaintiff Jane Doe No. 2, who is currently 18 years old, was 14 years old when she 
was first sold for sex in Massachusetts and Connecticut through Backpage.com.  She resides in 
Rhode Island. 
9. Plaintiff Jane Doe No. 3, who is currently 18 years old, was approximately 15 
years old when she was first sold for sex in Massachusetts and Florida through various means, 
including Backpage.com.  She resides in Massachusetts. 
10. Defendant Backpage.com, LLC is a Delaware limited liability company with a 
principal place of business in Dallas, Texas. Backpage.com LLC does business as Backpage.com, 
EvilEmpire.com, and BigCity.com and owns, operates, designs, and controls the websites 
Backpage.com, EvilEmpire.com, and BigCity.com. At all times material hereto, Defendant 
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Backpage.com, LLC transacted business in Massachusetts through its Backpage.com, 
EvilEmpire.com, and BigCity.com websites.  
11. Defendant Carl Ferrer is the CEO of Backpage.com, LLC. At all times material 
hereto, Defendant Ferrer transacted business in Massachusetts, including through Backpage.com, 
EvilEmpire.com, and BigCity.com.  
12. Defendant Michael Lacey is an owner of Backpage.com, LLC. At all times 
material hereto, Defendant Lacey transacted business in Massachusetts, including through 
Backpage.com, EvilEmpire.com, and BigCity.com. 
13. Defendant James Larkin is an owner of Backpage.com, LLC. At all times material 
hereto, Defendant Larkin transacted business in Massachusetts, including through Backpage.com, 
EvilEmpire.com, and BigCity.com. 
JURISDICTION & VENUE 
14. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1338(a), and 1367, as 
well as § 1332 (with an amount in controversy that exceeds $75,000).  
15. Venue is proper in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 and § 1400(a).  
FACTS COMMON TO ALL COUNTS 
A. Backpage.com is the world’s largest and most profitable online marketplace 
for illegal sex trafficking. 
16. Backpage is the “market leader” in online commercial sex advertising.  2017 
Senate Report at 6 (Ex. A).  Over the past decade or more, marketing for prostitution has migrated 
to the Internet, as website operators have sought to enable buyers and sellers of sex to maintain 
their anonymity and minimize the risk of detection by law enforcement.  Named for the infamous 
“Back Page” of the Village Voice newspaper, Backpage.com has become the primary destination 
for buying and selling illegal commercial sex online, accounting for 80 percent or more of all 
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revenue from online commercial sex advertising in the United States.  Id. at 6 (Ex. A).  Virtually 
all of Backpage’s net revenue—more than 99 percent—is directly attributable to advertisements 
appearing in its “Adult” category,” and its net profit in 2015 alone was estimated at $135 million; 
Backpage.com and its affiliates have been valued at more than $600 million.  Press Release, 
Attorney General Kamala D. Harris Announces Criminal Charges Against Senior Corporate 
Officers of Backpage.com for Profiting from Prostitution and Arrest of Carl Ferrer, CEO, State 
of California Department of Justice Office of the Attorney General (Oct. 6, 2016), available at 
https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-kamala-d-harris-announces-criminal-
charges-against-senior; 2017 Senate Report at 43, 45 (Ex. A).  
17. As of January 2017, Backpage operates in 97 countries and 943 geographic 
locations across six continents globally.  Id. at 45 (Ex. A).  In Massachusetts, Backpage.com lists 
ads in seven geographic locations. 
18. Backpage.com, at all material times,1 included an advertisement category 
conspicuously labeled “Adult Entertainment.”  The “Adult Entertainment” category contains a 
number of subcategories, including one labeled “Escorts.”  Although Backpage.com allows 
individuals to post free classified advertisements for lawful consumer products such as used 
bicycles and furniture in many different categories across the website, the focus of its business 
always has been the unlawful commercial sex industry: the advertisements in the “Adult 
Entertainment” category are the only ones for which Backpage charged a fee to make a posting, 
                                                 
1 On January 9, 2017, hours before the U.S. Senate convened its hearing, Backpage announced the 
shutdown of its Adult Entertainment section.  This change was a sham; the majority of 
advertisements for illegal commercial sex formerly posted under the Adult Entertainment section 
simply moved to the Dating section.  In any event, throughout the time period material in this 
litigation, Backpage.com’s Adult Entertainment section was fully operational. 
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and advertisements for illegal commercial sex, such as sex with children, are routinely posted in 
this category. 
19. At all material times, the charge to place an advertisement in the “Escorts” section 
was $12.00 in most geographic areas, including Boston and the surrounding metropolitan region, 
though Backpage.com charged up to $17.00 per advertisement in some areas of New York City.  
Backpage.com also offered to repost advertisements for an additional charge.  In Massachusetts, 
for example, four reposts cost $48.00, eight reposts cost $96.00, twelve reposts cost $144.00, and 
twenty-six reposts cost $288.00. 
B. Backpage knowingly participates in child sex trafficking. 
20. It is estimated that tens of thousands of children are trafficked for sex on 
Backpage.com annually in the United States. The average age of first exploitation for these 
children is only 15 years old.  
21. Backpage.com is the preferred avenue for traffickers to advertise children for sale 
for illegal sex in the United States.  According to reports from the National Center for Missing 
and Exploited Children (NCMEC), the leading nonprofit organization in the United States 
working with law enforcement to combat sex trafficking of children, “73% of the suspected child 
trafficking reports it receives from the public involve Backpage.”  2017 Senate Report at 6 
(Ex. A).  Though the Defendants may dispute the frequency with which Backpage.com 
advertisements involve children, Defendants are well aware that ads for minors have appeared 
frequently on Backpage.com.  Indeed, the persistent use of Backpage.com to traffic children has 
been communicated to Defendants by numerous law enforcement agencies, including the state 
attorneys general of all 50 states and by NCMEC.   
22. In April 2015, the Senate Subcommittee began to investigate Backpage.  Id. at 10 
(Ex. A).  Following an interview with Backpage’s general counsel Elizabeth McDougall, in which 
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McDougall refused to answer relevant questions about Backpage’s business practices, in August 
2015, the Senate Subcommittee issued subpoenas for the depositions of two Backpage employees.  
Id. at 10–11 (Ex. A).  The two employees retained individual counsel and declined to testify, 
invoking their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.  Id. at 11 (Ex. A).  An 
October 2015 subpoena to Backpage requested documents related to, among other topics, 
Backpage’s (i) review of proposed advertisements, including information related to any altering 
or modifying of advertisements before publication, (ii) document retention and data policies, (iii) 
basic corporate information, and (iv) revenue derived from adult advertisements.  Id. at 10 
(Ex. A).  Backpage refused to comply with the subpoena beyond production of a small amount of 
largely irrelevant material.  Id. at 11 (Ex. A).  Subsequently, the Senate Subcommittee issued a 
subpoena to Defendant Ferrer, the CEO of Backpage.com, to appear and testify at a public 
hearing.   
23. On November 19, 2015, the Senate Subcommittee held its first hearing on 
Backpage’s role in the trafficking of children on the Internet.  Id. at 12 (Ex. A).  Defendant Ferrer 
failed to appear for the hearing, purporting to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege through 
counsel.  Id. at 12 (Ex. A). 
24. Following the failure of further efforts to secure compliance with the Senate 
Subcommittee’s subpoena, on March 17, 2016, the Senate unanimously voted to adopt a 
resolution authorizing and directing Senate Legal Counsel to bring a civil action under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1365 to enforce the subpoena.  Id. at 12 (Ex. A).  This was the first civil contempt resolution 
adopted by the Senate against any person or entity in more than twenty years.  Id. at 1 (Ex. A).  
Thereafter, the Senate Subcommittee successfully overcame the efforts by Backpage to resist 
judicial enforcement of the subpoena through extensive litigation in the District Court for the 
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District of Columbia, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, and the United States Supreme 
Court.  In the fall of 2016, Backpage eventually produced certain documents responsive to the 
subpoena, and the Senate Subcommittee deposed a number of current and former Backpage 
employees.    
25. The Senate Subcommittee’s 20-month investigation into Backpage and its 
practices culminated in the 2017 Senate Report, titled “Backpage.com’s Knowing Facilitation of 
Online Sex Trafficking.”  After reviewing over one million pages of documents, the Senate 
Subcommittee concluded, inter alia, that “Backpage has knowingly concealed evidence of 
criminality by systematically editing its ‘adult’ ads,” and that “Backpage knows that it facilitates 
prostitution and child sex trafficking.”  Id. at 3, 16 (Ex. A).  
26. At a public hearing on January 10, 2017, the Defendants Ferrer, Lacey, and Larkin 
(as well as Backpage’s general counsel, Ms. McDougall, and another senior executive) each 
invoked the Fifth Amendment in refusing to respond to any questions from the Senate 
Subcommittee regarding various aspects of their active support of sex trafficking of children on 
the website.  See Transcript of Senate Hearing 115–16 at 11–19, U.S. Senate Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations, Jan. 10, 2017 (Ex. B).2   
27. The evidence revealed by the Senate Report confirms that Backpage is a criminal 
enterprise whose entire business model fosters and depends upon the advertising and sale of 
human beings for illegal commercial sex.  The structure of the website and the efforts of its 
employees are devoted to attracting advertisements for illegal commercial sex and participating 
                                                 
2 Defendants Ferrer, Lacey, and Larkin also invoked the Fifth Amendment in refusing to provide 
any information in response to Plaintiffs’ discovery requests during limited discovery in this 
matter.  See Ex. C (Individual Defendants’ Answers and Responses to Plaintiffs’ First Request for 
the Production of Documents); Ex. D (Individual Defendants’ Answers and Responses to 
Plaintiffs’ First Set of Interrogatories to Defendants). 
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in various ways with the advertisers to facilitate the successful completion of the illegal 
transactions, including those involving paid sex with children.   
C. Backpage knowingly makes material alterations to the content of 
advertisements for illegal commercial sex, including sex with children.  
28. Backpage understands that its profitability depends on minimizing the level of law 
enforcement scrutiny of its advertisers, particularly those who are trafficking in children.  The 
underlying assumption by Defendants is that law enforcement will focus most of its scarce 
resources on clearly illegal advertisements of children and that minimal attention will be devoted 
to the more ambiguous arena of illegal commercial sex involving adults.  To accomplish its goals, 
therefore, Backpage developed a multi-tiered system of review or “moderation” of 
advertisements, as well as other practices, to “sanitize” advertisements that would tend to draw 
the attention of law enforcement personnel seeking to identify victims of child sex trafficking.  
The practices include Backpage’s intentional and purposeful removal or obscuring of plain 
indications in proposed advertisements that a child is being offered for sale.  
29. According to Backpage’s general counsel, Ms. McDougall, as of June 2015, 
Backpage employed a team of 120 moderators.  U.S. Senate Recommendation to Enforce a 
Subpoena Issued to the CEO of Backpage.com LLC, at 14 (2016) (Ex. E).  Although the 
mechanics of the moderation has changed over time—as detailed in the 2017 Report and as 
discussed below—at all relevant times Backpage has reviewed and altered the majority of the 
advertisements submitted to Backpage.com.  Indeed, Backpage prides itself on having moderators 
individually review every single advertisement submitted to the “adult” section.  See Supp. Decl. 
of Harry H. Schneider, Jr., Ex. 15, J.S., et al. v. Village Voice Media Holdings LLC, et al., No. 
12-2-11362-4, at 11:32-34 (Wash. Sup. Ct. May 17, 2017) (Ex. F).   
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30. By Backpage’s own estimates, it has altered the content of approximately 80 
percent of the advertisements submitted to the “adult” section of its website.  2017 Senate Report 
at 2 (Ex. A).  Indeed, based on a limited production of documents by Backpage to the Plaintiffs 
in this action, Plaintiffs can confirm that Backpage deleted photographs from 50 percent of the 
produced advertisements that featured Plaintiff Jane Doe No. 3.   
31. Internal Backpage emails confirm that, as of August 2016, its moderators 
continued to manually alter the advertisements that users submitted.  Id. at 39 (Ex. A).  
Backpage’s limited production to Plaintiffs in this action confirms this information, as the 
produced documents reflect alterations to advertisements dated from May and June of 2016. 
32. These alterations often materially change the very nature of the advertisement’s 
content by removing or obscuring any indicia that the advertisement involves a child. 
33. At all relevant times, when posting an advertisement in the “Escorts” section on 
Backpage.com, the user had to draft an advertisement using the posting interface on the website. 
The interface required that the advertiser first provide a title; the age of person advertised; a 
description, i.e., the text of the advertisement; and the advertiser’s email address. Backpage then 
offered the option of entering a location and contact information, and the opportunity to upload 
images and videos to include with the advertisement. 
34. After each proposed advertisement was entered in the space provided on the 
website, Defendants “filtered” the advertisement through a proprietary software program that 
reviewed the language to detect certain words that signaled that the transaction involved illegal 
sex.  The list of signals included words or phrases, such as “girl friend experience,” “30 minutes,” 
“quickie,” “satisfaction guaranteed,” “temporary girl friend,” “VIP service,” “willing to please,” 
“you PAY 2 PLAY,” and “no limits,” which were codes for prostitution.  It also included terms 
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such as “young,” “teen,” “barely legal,” “Lolita,” “school girl,” and “fresh,” which were known 
in the marketplace to signal that a child was the subject of the proposed advertisement. Senate 
Appendix at 261–275 (Ex. G).  The automated filter was the primary repository of the terms that 
Backpage wished to ban from the website, and Defendants continually reviewed and expanded 
the list of banned terms, which eventually included thousands of words.  Id. at 143–144 (Ex. H), 
314–315 (Ex. I).  When the automated filter detected a term included on the list of banned terms, 
the filter would delete it, but the proposed advertisement still would be posted in that revised form 
awaiting the next tier of review.   
35. The automated filtering process, known at all relevant times as the “Strip Term 
From Ad Filter,” resulted in changes to the wording of—in the words of Defendant Ferrer—
“almost every adult ad[vertisement]” posted on the website.  2017 Senate Report at 25 (Ex. A); 
Senate Appendix at 248 (Ex. J).  The Senate Subcommittee found that Defendants understood that 
some of the terms in the automatic filter signaled that a child was the subject of the proposed 
advertisement.  2017 Senate Report at 24 (Ex. A).  Indeed, Defendant Ferrer “personally directed 
or approved the addition of new words to the Strip Term From Ad Filter, and Backpage 
documents clearly show he understood their implications for child exploitation.”  Id. at 24 (Ex. 
A).  For example, after adding the word “Lolita” to the list, Defendant Ferrer explained to a 
Backpage moderator that Backpage added “Lolita” to this list because it is widely recognized 
“code for under aged girl[s].”  Senate Appendix at 156 (Ex. K). As the Senate Subcommittee 
concluded, “the ‘Strip Term From Ad’ filter changed nothing about the true nature of the 
advertised transaction or the real age of the person being sold for sex.”  2017 Senate Report at 2 
(Ex. A).  Yet, “thanks to the filter,” Backpage’s adult category advertisements looked, in the 
words of Backpage employees, “cleaner than ever.”  Id. at 2 (Ex. A).   
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36. Following the completion of the automated filtering process, the newly posted 
(and usually already altered) advertisements were reviewed by a Backpage employee, known as 
a moderator.  Id. at 2 (Ex. A); Senate Appendix at 314–315 (Ex. I).  The role of the moderators, 
who were not aware that proposed advertisements had been through the automated filtering 
process, was to detect any remaining language in the advertisement that would signal a transaction 
for illegal commercial sex and to review any photographs that were posted with the advertisement.  
2017 Senate Report at 33 (Ex. A).  When they learned that some moderators wholesale rejected 
(i.e., pulled from the website) proposed advertisements that were blatantly illegal, Backpage 
executives sent a blast email to the entire moderator team instructing them to “stop Failing [sic] 
ads and begin Editing [sic].”  Id. at 28 (Ex. A).  In other words, Backpage executives directed 
moderators to increase altering the content of the advertisements to remove or obscure the indicia 
of illegality.   
37. Defendant Ferrer encouraged moderators “to be subjective [in their edits] and not 
cause too much damage” to Backpage’s relationship with traffickers who regularly advertised on 
the site or to the business’s revenue stream.  Senate Appendix at 96 (Ex. S).  Thus, moderators 
were instructed and expected to “edit ads for explicit sexual language [and] anything to do with 
[money]” in order to create the false appearance that the advertisements could be for legal 
transactions.  Id. at 1-3 (Ex. L).  Similarly, moderators were instructed to delete any terms 
indicating a child was involved that the filter did not detect, despite knowing that the 
advertisement was selling sex with a child.  For example, when an advertisement used the word 
“tean” (rather than the word “teen” contained in the filter program), Defendant Ferrer instructed 
the moderator to simply remove the word, rather than rejecting the advertisement altogether.  Id. 
at 305 (Ex. M).   
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38. As to the photographs that accompanied a proposed advertisement, Backpage’s 
moderators removed “images indicative of criminality, including child sex trafficking” from 
advertisements.  2017 Senate Report at 1 (Ex. A).  Even if a photograph included the face of an 
individual who any reasonable person would recognize to be a minor, Backpage had a practice of 
deleting such photographs and allowing the modified advertisement to post on the website, instead 
of blocking the advertisement (and its poster) and alerting authorities. 
39. Moderators were instructed to delete pictures that appeared to the moderators to 
be children, and then to approve and post the ad.  Senate Appendix at 132 (Ex. N).  Indeed, even 
when a moderator noted that the same trafficker had submitted pictures of children two or three 
times, a Backpage senior executive instructed the moderator to simply delete the picture again 
and post the advertisement selling the child for sex.  Id. at 298 (Ex. O).   
40. However, Backpage soon realized that the practice of removing those photos could 
deter some of its users.  Indeed, Backpage instructed its moderators to remove child-sex 
advertisements and photographs only “IF YOU REALLY VERY SURE [sic] THE PERSON IS 
UNDERAGE. . . IF IN DOUBT ABOUT UNDERAGE : [sic] The process for now should be to 
accept the ad . . . .”  Senate Appendix at 358 (Ex. P) (emphasis in original).  Backpage directed 
its moderators not to modify ads with “just a few pics of up close genital[s]” but only those that 
contained “LEGIT nude/extreme images” that made the proposed ad clearly illegal.  Id. at 405 
(Ex. Q) (emphasis in original).  Backpage warned its moderators after altering or removing text 
or images not to “abuse the lock ad feature—[or] users will probably email in” to complain.  Id.   
41. Documents produced by Backpage during limited discovery in this matter confirm 
that Backpage had a regular practice, through at least 2016, of deleting certain images from 
advertisements.  In the small subset of advertisements from 2016 produced by Backpage in this 
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action, Backpage deleted photographs from 50 percent of the produced advertisements relating to 
Jane Doe No. 3.  In 25 percent of the produced advertisements relating to Jane Doe No. 3, the 
photographs deleted by Backpage include portions of Jane Doe No. 3’s face. 
42. Backpage has represented that explicit photographs are deleted from 
advertisements because they violate Backpage.com’s “Terms of Use.”  But Backpage’s 
“administrative data” does not reliably record “Terms of Use” violations.  The “administrative 
data” for each advertisement contains a series of checkboxes that purport to indicate whether 
certain categories of moderation were conducted on that advertisement.  See, e.g., Ex. R at BP-
MA-JD#3-000047.  These include checkboxes for, inter alia, “Inappropriate Content,” “Violated 
Terms of Use,” and “Strip Term From Ad.”  In Backpage’s production of documents in this 
matter, several advertisements reflect that Backpage moderators deleted images that contain full 
frontal nudity.  See, e.g., id. at BP-MA-JD#3-000044.  However, no advertisement with deleted 
images had either the “Inappropriate Content” or “Violated Terms of Use” checkbox selected.  
See, e.g., id. at BP-MA-JD#3-000047.   
43. These inconsistencies demonstrate that Backpage did not reliably record the 
conduct of its moderation processes.  They likewise cast doubt on Backpage’s assertion in this 
matter, through its counsel, that the absence of any selected “Strip Term From Ad” checkbox in 
the produced documents should be understood as confirmation that none of the produced 
advertisements were altered by the “Strip Term from Ad” filter. 
44. At the conclusion of this initial moderator review step in the moderation process, 
Backpage instructed moderators to “lock[]” the ad, preventing the user from making changes 
while it was “live” on Backpage.com.  Senate Appendix at 96–97 (Ex. S). 
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45. After the automated filtering and initial moderator review was complete, a smaller 
senior team of moderators conducted yet another review of advertisements.  Defendant Ferrer 
regularly participated in this process.  This phase focused principally on the advertisements that 
the initial moderator had rejected outright because they so blatantly proposed illegal commercial 
sex or sex with a child and could not reasonably be modified to obscure that fact.  In many 
instances, the senior moderator overrode the judgment of the initial moderator, materially altered 
the rejected advertisement to obscure any indicia of illegality, and then posted it on the website.   
46. After the moderation process was complete, the original draft advertisement was 
deleted from Backpage’s system, thus leaving no record of the original language drafted by the 
poster.  Senate Appendix at 141 (Ex. T).   
47. Documents produced by Backpage during limited discovery in this action confirm 
that Backpage did not retain copies of original, as-submitted advertisements and did not keep 
reliable records of changes to the text of advertisements, thereby obscuring the extent of 
Backpage’s alterations to such advertisements.  Specifically, Plaintiff Jane Doe No. 3 produced 
an email from Backpage to an email address associated with Jane Doe No. 3, dated May 27, 2016, 
relating to an advertisement featuring Jane Doe No. 3 that was posted on Backpage.com 
(appended hereto as Exhibit U).    Backpage produced an advertisement with the same “Post ID” 
as the advertisement identified in this email, yet the title of the posted and produced advertisement 
(Ex. R) was not the same as the title of the advertisement in the email.3  Backpage claims that the 
modification to the title of the advertisement between submission and publication must have been 
made by the user, but the “administrative data” that Backpage produced with this advertisement 
                                                 
3 Backpage, through its attorneys, has represented that an identical Post ID means that the 
advertisement referenced in Jane Doe No. 3’s email and the advertisement produced by Backpage 
are the same advertisement. 
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nowhere indicates that any “user” edit occurred.  Indeed, it does not suggest that any alteration 
occurred at all.  See Ex. R.  The fact that Backpage did not produce any version of this 
advertisement with the original title reflected in the email confirms that Backpage does not retain 
copies of original, as-submitted advertisements.  That the “administrative data” does not indicate 
that any edit was made to the advertisement – by the user or otherwise – casts doubt on whether 
Backpage’s records accurately reflect which advertisements had text altered and by whom. 
48. The Senate Subcommittee found that Backpage’s moderation process operated to 
remove explicit references to the likely illegality of the underlying transaction—not to prevent 
illegal conduct from taking place on its site.  2017 Senate Report at 2 (Ex. A).  This intended 
result occurred due to both the design of the process and the instructions to employees not to 
“look too far into things to make [advertisements] illegal.”  Senate Appendix at 372 (Ex. V).  As 
one senior executive boasted about the moderation process, “[b]etween everyone’s manual 
moderation, both in the queue and on the site . . . things are cleaner than ever in the Adult section.”  
Id. at 158–163 (Ex. W).  In other words, Backpage had sufficiently altered or sanitized the 
advertisements so that illegal transactions involving children were not readily detectable by law 
enforcement.   
49. The purpose of Defendants’ efforts to facilitate the success of illegal sex 
trafficking advertisements was understood by Backpage employees.  Several former employees 
testified during the course of the Senate Subcommittee investigation that (i) it was generally 
understood that a significant number of advertisements on Backpage.com were for prostitution, 
(ii) it was “common knowledge” among moderators that the illegal character of sex trafficking 
remains (albeit concealed) after removal of terms plainly indicating that the ad involves illegal 
Case 1:17-cv-11069-LTS   Document 64   Filed 04/12/18   Page 17 of 39
 
 
18 
 
commercial sex, and (iii) that moderators were expected to “sanitize” advertisements involving 
illegal conduct in order to enhance profits.  2017 Senate Report at 31-32 (Ex. A). 
50. The extent of Backpage’s moderation practices concerning children is illustrated 
by the testimony of a police investigator from the Cook County, Illinois’ Sheriff’s Office who 
was involved in another lawsuit against Backpage in which the investigator, posing as a child, 
submitted a sting advertisement to Backpage.com entitled “Red beauty 14-18.”  Ex. P to Response 
of Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations to Resp. Carl Ferrer’s Surreply at 3, Senate 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations v. Ferrer, Misc. No. 1:16-mc-00621-RMC (D.D.C. 
June 2, 2016), Dkt. No. 14-2 (Ex. X).  The body of the advertisement stated, “Hello gentlemen, 
I’m Tracy I just graduated grade school & I’m a lil lonely and bored. I like to play and I’m very 
talented & you won’t be disappointed. E-mail me today.”  Id.  When the advertisement posted to 
Backpage.com, however, Defendants had changed the title to read “Red Beauty 18,” (i.e., deleting 
“14-”) and, in the body of the advertisement, changed the phrase “I just graduated grade school” 
to “I just graduated” (i.e., deleting “grade school”) to “clean” the advertisement and obscure the 
fact that the ad purported to sell the sexual services of a child.  Id.   
51. Defendants have claimed that any modification to the “Red Beauty” advertisement 
must have been made by the user, not by Backpage (as with the advertisement relating to Jane 
Doe No. 3 discussed at paragraph 47, supra), yet Backpage has not and, as discussed supra, likely 
cannot produce any record of any user edits.  And, as Backpage itself has pointed out, Investigator 
Bronson from the Cook County Sherriff’s Department filed a report stating that “[t]he ad . . . was 
posted by the website [Backpage.com] with changes that R/I [the investigator] did not make.”  
See App. B to Defs.’ Mem. Law Supp. Mot. Dismiss, Dkt. 32-2, at 2 n.1 (appending Carl Ferrer’s 
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“Corrected Surreply” in Senate Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations v. Ferrer, No. 1:16-mc-
00621-RMC (D.D.C.)). 
52. In addition to modifying advertisements through the automated and manual 
moderation processes, Defendant Ferrer and senior Backpage employees routinely communicated 
directly with certain customers by telephone and email, and provided instructions and advice to 
these customers about how to conform advertisements to the model Backpage had developed.  
This often resulted in additional changes to the content of existing advertisements and the posting 
of proposed advertisements that initially had been rejected by moderators for illegal content.  
Indeed, according to the Defendants, 75 percent of the customers directly contacted by 
Defendants changed the content of their advertisements based on the instructions and advice 
received.  Senate Appendix at 187 (Ex. Y).  
53. By directly modifying the advertisements or by causing the traffickers to do so 
themselves, Defendants were able to take an advertisement that originally proposed to sell a child 
for sex and transform it into an advertisement that purported to merely advertise an adult seeking 
legal companionship.  This practice supported a critical business goal of Defendants to attract a 
high volume of activity to the website in order to grow and sustain the market perception of 
Backpage.com as the essential source of online support for the sellers of illegal commercial sex.  
Thus, each advertisement altered by Defendants contributed to the overall ability of the website 
to facilitate the sale of illegal commercial sex.  
54. Defendants were aware that their efforts to alter and develop the content of 
advertisements originally written by sex traffickers—specifically, by making critical alterations 
designed to transform an advertisement from one obviously soliciting illegal sex with a minor 
into one that would not draw meaningful law enforcement scrutiny—could subject them to both 
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criminal and civil liability under federal and state sex trafficking statutes.  For example, 
Defendant Larkin sent an email to Defendant Ferrer in which he cautioned against possible public 
disclosure of the alteration of content by Backpage, stating: “We need to stay away from the very 
idea of ‘editing’ the posts, as you know.”  Id. at 432 (Ex. Z).  This reference apparently reflected 
Backpage’s intention to structure their activities to obtain the protection from liability provided 
by Section 230 of the CDA.  Defendant Ferrer similarly recognized that Backpage’s ability to 
avoid liability was “about CDA protection,” Id. at 14 (Ex. AA), which Defendants Ferrer and 
Larkin understood would not extend to illegal content that Backpage itself (rather than a third 
party) created or developed as a result of altering advertisements to, in its own moderator’s words, 
“put[ ] lipstick on a pig,” 2017 Senate Report at 36–37 (Ex. A). 
55. As described above, documents produced by Backpage in this action confirm that, 
in order to hide its material modifications to advertisements and its complicity with traffickers 
and their sale of children for sex, Backpage (i) deleted and kept no record of advertisements in 
the form they were originally submitted, and (ii) did not reliably or consistently track 
modifications that were made to submitted advertisements.  As a result of these practices, 
Backpage is able to obscure the extent of its “moderation” practices. 
D. Backpage developed interactive website features to further assist traffickers 
in creating effective ads to sell sex. 
56. In addition to Defendants’ success in materially altering the content of 
advertisements through filtering, moderation, and direct communications with traffickers, 
Defendants also created posting rules designed to create an appearance of an active effort to 
prohibit illegal conduct by preventing the use of certain terms.  In fact, the posting process 
intentionally operated to provide guidance to those traffickers whom the Defendants could not 
coach directly by email or telephone to improve the prospect that their advertisements would reap 
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maximum financial returns while eluding law enforcement scrutiny.  Indeed, Defendant Ferrer 
stated that he wanted to be able to teach posters “what they did wrong.”  Id. at 21 (Ex. A); Senate 
Appendix at 96 (Ex. S). 
57. Defendants accomplished this goal through an interactive platform that taught 
traffickers the terms and phrases that will most likely attract the attention of law enforcement, and 
that provided guidance on substitute language.  The Senate Subcommittee found that the purpose 
of Backpage’s platform design was not to “actively prohibit and combat illegal content,” but 
rather to “guide [traffickers] on how to easily circumvent those measures and post ‘clean’ ads.”  
2017 Senate Report at 34 (Ex. A).    
E. Beyond helping traffickers draft effective advertisements, Backpage 
endeavors by various other means to shield traffickers from law 
enforcement. 
58. In addition to controlling and assisting in drafting the content of advertisements 
appearing on the website, the Defendants adopted various other means to minimize risk that 
traffickers of children would be detected by law enforcement.  These various features of the 
business were intended, in combination, to grow the volume of advertising on the website, with 
a full understanding that these practices would increase the incidence of advertisements involving 
children, and to extend the period of time during which a given child would be exploited.   
59. For example, the Defendants made it difficult, if not impossible, to track any 
photographs posted on Backpage.com. Any photograph taken by traffickers is embedded with 
“metadata” when it is uploaded to the website.  This metadata consists of identifying information 
that typically reflects the date, time, geolocation, and other identifying information.  However, 
Defendants adjusted their server software, at additional expense, to erase the metadata from each 
uploaded photo, so as to impede efforts by law enforcement to use the photo to identify the 
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trafficked child or to track the traffickers Backpage has partnered with to sexually exploit 
children. 
60. The Defendants also helped traffickers evade prosecution by allowing them to post 
their phone numbers by spelling out the digits of their numbers rather than using numerals.  For 
example, the numerals “617” can be written instead as “six-1-seven.”  This format makes it nearly 
impossible for law enforcement to scan posts for numbers, identify trackers, and conduct sting 
operations to rescue children.  Given that the Defendants were already materially altering 
approximately 80 percent of escort advertisements, it would have been easy to rewrite all 
telephone numbers using numerals or, more simply, to require posters to enter a numerical phone 
number, as Backpage does for other sections of its website.  
61. In addition, Defendants did not require traffickers to verify the phone numbers 
they posted in connection with an advertisement in the “Adult Entertainment” section, despite 
requiring this verification for other sections of its website.  In effect, Backpage makes it harder 
for someone to sell a dog or cat in its “Pets” section than it does for someone to sell a child for 
sex in its “Adult Entertainment” section.  Anyone trying to sell a dog or cat through “Pets” must 
verify his or her telephone number, while anyone trying to sell a child for sex through “Adult 
Entertainment” need not.  Backpage understands that the telephone verification process creates 
an additional record and evidentiary trail that law enforcement could use to break up the 
trafficking scheme and, in not requiring such verification, Backpage eliminated one of the 
avenues available to contact victims and help rescue them.   
F. Backpage continues to develop its model to increase demand and its own 
market share for illegal commercial sex, including sex with children. 
62. Backpage has continuously enhanced its business model to increase demand, to 
grow its market share, and to enhance Defendants’ own profits. 
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63. For example, Defendants are known to draft and post fake advertisements for 
illegal commercial sex on Backpage.com to create the appearance of an exceptional level of 
patronage of the website, and to thus foster the impression among traffickers and customers alike 
that Backpage.com is the most desirable site in the online sex business.  In addition, Defendants 
are known to contact traffickers already using other sites to advertise illegal commercial sex and 
encourage them to switch and use Backpage.com’s services. 
64. Defendants Ferrer, Lacey, and Larkin also created two additional websites, 
EvilEmpire.com (“EvilEmpire”) and BigCity.com (“BigCity”).  Defendants provide all of the 
content hosted, published, and featured on EvilEmpire and almost all of the content on BigCity.  
Third parties are unable to post on EvilEmpire. 
65. EvilEmpire creates a webpage for each trafficker, without even notifying the 
trafficker that the page has been created, that is identified and sorted by his phone number, in 
which all of the trafficked adults and children controlled by that trafficker are listed for purchase.  
Clicking on one of the advertisements redirects the purchaser to the full advertisement initially 
posted on Backpage.com.  Some of these advertisements also feature a link for the same 
advertisement posted on BigCity.  Often the same trafficked child will be featured in different 
advertisements with different names and different ages, all on the same trafficker’s EvilEmpire 
webpage.   
66. A cursory view of such a webpage makes it clear that the ages listed are false.  
Defendants use EvilEmpire to further their trafficking venture with the traffickers and to make 
the sale of trafficked adults and children more efficient and profitable.  By creating the EvilEmpire 
webpages, Defendants knowingly conspire with traffickers to falsely represent that a trafficked 
child is over 18. 
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67. BigCity is organized in a similar manner and is similarly designed to increase the 
profit of and demand for Backpage’s sex trafficking ventures.  However, where EvilEmpire 
organizes webpages by trafficker, BigCity organizes its webpages by trafficked child or adult.  
BigCity’s homepage is comprised of a grid of pictures of naked or nearly naked individuals in 
erotic poses, and each picture is a link to the trafficked adult’s or child’s “profile,” which includes 
that individual’s name, age, phone number, and location.  Defendants historically had exclusive 
control over the content of BigCity, as they do with EvilEmpire.  However, although Defendants 
continue to create the majority of the profiles on BigCity, traffickers can now create their own 
“profiles” for their trafficked adults and children. 
68. Defendants systematically cross-post advertisements on Backpage.com, BigCity, 
and EvilEmpire, often without the knowledge of the trafficker or user who submitted the original 
ad.  Defendants know that listing advertisements on all three of its websites increases the 
likelihood that the traffickers will complete a sale.  By operating and providing content to these 
websites, Defendants effectively partner with traffickers to make the sale of illegal sex easier and 
more lucrative.  And, as Defendants strip the metadata from advertisements on the main 
Backpage.com website, Defendants similarly strip the metadata from photographs on BigCity and 
EvilEmpire to protect the traffickers who participate in their joint venture.  Defendants 
intentionally designed and currently run EvilEmpire and BigCity to help traffickers posting on 
Backpage.com increase their exposure to potential purchasers without increasing their risk of 
detection by law enforcement.  
G. Backpage attempted to obscure its active participation in sex trafficking by 
characterizing itself as the “Sheriff of the Internet.” 
69. In or around 2010, as Backpage.com began to emerge as a significant presence in 
the online sex advertising business, Defendants developed a plan to minimize the attention 
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devoted to its activities by the public and by law enforcement agencies, particularly concerning 
advertising of children on its website.  
70. Defendants undertook to forge seemingly cooperative relationships with many law 
enforcement agencies and to convey the impression that they were (i) actively and successfully 
engaged in efforts to identify and report child sex trafficking victims and (ii) otherwise 
“partnering” with law enforcement to minimize the risk of exploitation of children on the website.  
As part of this façade, the Backpage Defendants regularly asserted that they were engaged in 
efforts to stop child sex trafficking through Backpage.com. Indeed, Defendants regularly 
characterized themselves as the “sheriff” of the Internet helping to defeat the “scourge” of online 
child sex trafficking. 
71. To further this scheme, Defendants initiated numerous interactions with state and 
federal law enforcement agencies beginning in or about 2010. Defendants provided assurances 
to these agencies that they would be vigilant in attempting to detect unlawful trafficking of minors 
through various means, would improve and increase the volume of reporting of suspicious 
advertisements, and would be a model for cooperation with law enforcement efforts. 
72. Despite these representations, Defendants intended only to engage in the most 
superficial efforts to work with these agencies, and only to the extent necessary to divert the 
attention of these agencies from the growing market share and business success of 
Backpage.com.  For example, Defendants made promises to aggressively report suspected 
instances of child sex trafficking to NCMEC, the leading nonprofit organization in the United 
States working with law enforcement, families, and the professionals who serve them on issues 
related to missing and sexually exploited children. Despite those representations, Defendants took 
affirmative steps internally to assure that the reporting was both superficial and minimal.  Senate 
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Appendix at 309 (Ex. BB).  In addition, at one point, Defendants considered implementing a faulty 
photo verification process on Backpage.com that would be “easy to get around” in order to “create 
a false sense of security.”  Indeed, Defendants thought that having such a system “riddled with 
loopholes” would allow the Defendants to “stop reporting to NCMEC” altogether.  Senate 
Appendix at 286 (Ex. CC).   
73. The promises by Defendants to law enforcement about aggressive reporting of 
child sex advertisements were a Potemkin-like subterfuge.  By various means, Backpage actively 
managed its systems to minimize the number of advertisements reported to NCMEC, to avoid 
confirming the high frequency of child sex trafficking on its website.  For example, a senior 
Backpage executive set an artificial quota of no more than 16 reports to NCMEC daily from all 
394 markets served by the website, despite knowing more advertisements for minors existed.  
Senate Appendix at 309 (Ex. BB).  Similarly, Backpage supervisors who did “not report young 
looking escorts” to NCMEC nevertheless received “very good” evaluations without any 
admonition to improve their reporting of child sex advertisements.  Id. at 307–308 (Ex. DD), 310–
311 (Ex. EE).  In one instance, a Backpage supervisor admonished a moderator for reporting to 
NCMEC a girl who looked “young,” “drugged,” and “ha[d] bruises.”  Id. at 381–383 (Ex. FF).  
As the Defendants noted: “were [sic] not trying to Bust [traffickers],” we just wanted to “clean 
up the front page” because “law enforcement rarely goes past page 2” on each advertisement.  Id. 
at 405 (Ex. Q).   
74. Defendants also developed internal policies governing the removal of 
advertisements designed to provide a public façade of concern with child sex trafficking, but 
which Defendants intended to be ineffective.  For example, if Backpage is notified that an 
advertisement in a particular market involves a child, Backpage will only consider removing the 
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advertisement in that market, and it will report the advertisement to NCMEC only if the 
information is communicated by an immediate family member of the child in the advertisement. 
Id. at 318 (Ex. GG).  Indeed, Defendants refused to take down advertisements for trafficked 
children when alerted by third parties—and even in one case, by the trafficked minor herself—
that the individuals advertised on Backpage.com were minors.  2017 Senate Report at 40 (Ex. A).  
Additionally, in those rare instances that Backpage does agree to take down a specific 
advertisement, it takes no steps to remove or report other advertisements for the same child, 
including even identical advertisements that are posted in other geographical regions.  Defendants 
do not identify or report other advertisements that are linked to the reported advertisement, and 
they do not identify or report advertisements involving the same phone number, web address, or 
other identifying information indicative of trafficking of that child or other children.   
75. These practices were designed to conceal the extent of child sex trafficking on 
Backpage.com, as well as Defendants’ knowledge of and efforts to exploit and profit from those 
advertisements.  As Defendants intended, these misrepresentations and manipulations served to 
protect the ability of traffickers to advertise children for sale through the website, to burnish 
Backpage.com’s reputation among human traffickers as a “safe” and favorable place to advertise 
sex trafficking victims, including children, and thereby to grow market share and increase 
profitability.     
H. Defendants Ferrer, Lacey, and Larkin attempted to conceal their continuing 
participation in sex trafficking by selling the company through foreign shell 
companies. 
76. After public attention to the activities of Defendants began to escalate in or about 
2014, and following the initiation of several lawsuits by children sold through Backpage.com, it 
became apparent to Defendants that their efforts to brand themselves as the “sheriff” of the 
Internet eventually would be exposed as false.  As a result, Defendants purportedly sold the 
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company in December 2014 to an undisclosed foreign company.  The Senate Subcommittee’s 
investigation eventually revealed, however, that “the company’s true beneficial owners [remain] 
James Larkin, Michael Lacey, and Carl Ferrer.”  The Senate further found that  
[a]cting through a series of domestic and international shell 
companies, Lacey and Larkin loaned Ferrer over $600 million for 
the purchase.  While Ferrer is now the nominal owner of Backpage, 
Lacey and Larkin retain near-total debt equity in the company, 
continue to reap Backpage profits in the form of loan repayments, 
and can exert control over Backpage’s operations and financial 
affairs.   
2017 Senate Report at 42 (Ex. A). 
77. The Senate Subcommittee could discern no economic rationale for the sale or the 
elaborate corporate structure created by Defendants, noting that the Dutch company serves as 
merely a “pass through” entity that provides the company no known tax benefits.  Id. at 50 (Ex. 
A).  Rather, the Senate Subcommittee concluded that the purpose of the sale was “to obscure the 
identity of the purchaser” and owner.  Id. at 46 (Ex. A). 
I. Defendants participated in trafficking Jane Doe No. 1 on Backpage.com 
when she was a minor. 
78. Jane Doe No. 1 was trafficked and sold for sex by traffickers—with the 
knowledge, participation, and aid of Backpage—to men across Massachusetts, New York, 
Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Maine who paid Jane Doe No. 1’s traffickers to rape her.  Jane 
Doe No. 1 estimates that she was raped over 600 times over the course of approximately four 
months at age 15. 
79. Jane Doe No. 1 was first trafficked on Backpage.com in November 2013, when 
she was 15 years old, after leaving her parents’ home and seeking help from a male relative.  That 
male relative submitted ads of Jane Doe No. 1 to Backpage.com and told her she had to go make 
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money for him and his associates by having sex with the men who responded to the 
advertisements.   
80. Over the course of four months, her relative and three associates trafficked Jane 
Doe No. 1 for sex on Backpage.com.  She was typically sold six days a week, and up to ten times 
a day.  Jane Doe No. 1 was forced to do “in-calls,” where she was raped at the hotel she was 
placed in by her traffickers, as well as “out-calls,” where she was raped at locations chosen by the 
men buying her. 
81. Defendants knew Jane Doe No. 1 was being trafficked for sex on Backpage.com.  
As described in detail in paragraphs 28–55, supra, during all relevant times, Defendants reviewed 
(i.e., “moderated”) every advertisement in the Adult Entertainment section of Backpage.com, 
which included the advertisements featuring Jane Doe No. 1 when she was 15 years old. 
82. Jane Doe No. 1’s trafficker attempted to indicate in advertisements he submitted 
to Backpage.com that Jane Doe No. 1 was a minor. Upon information and belief, Backpage 
materially altered the explicit language of these advertisements, removed certain words, and 
redrafted the advertisements to suggest Jane Doe No. 1 was an adult in the advertisements that 
were ultimately posted on the website.  Upon information and belief, in advertisements for Jane 
Doe No. 1, Backpage deleted words and/or images signaling the involvement of a child through 
the use of its automated filtering software (which included its list of prohibited terms) and/or 
through removal or alteration by its moderators, as is Backpage’s regular practice. 
83. As just one example of this material modification, Jane Doe No. 1 was advertised 
as a “Latina shorty” in the heading of an advertisement submitted to Backpage.com, and in that 
advertisement (and many others), she was also described as “fetish-friendly” in the narrative.  
“Shorty” or “shortie” is a slang term that can signify a young girl, and “fetish-friendly” is an 
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expression commonly used by sex traffickers to indicate that they are willing to let buyers pay 
extra to engage in especially violent and denigrating sexual conduct, commonly including 
slapping or choking.  On information and belief, sometime after these advertisements were 
submitted to Backpage.com, Backpage deleted the phrase “Latina shorty,” substituting the phrase 
“Exotic Latina.”  The removal of the term “shorty” – which signals a child – and the simultaneous 
replacement of that term with “exotic” – which means “foreign” – successfully transformed the 
advertisement from one explicitly selling a minor for sex to one that purported to sell a “foreign” 
adult (while retaining the open invitation for customers to treat Jane Doe No. 1 in a violent or 
otherwise seriously abusive manner).     
84. The advertisements posted on Backpage.com offering Jane Doe No. 1 for sale 
generally included one or more photographs of Jane Doe No. 1.  These photographs omitted or 
obscured her face but displayed her shoulders, legs, buttocks and/or breasts.  
85. After some months, Jane Doe No. 1’s mother identified her photographs on 
Backpage.com and, soon afterwards, law enforcement conducted a “sting” operation to rescue 
Jane Doe No. 1. 
J.  Defendants participated in trafficking Jane Doe No. 2 on Backpage.com 
when she was a minor. 
86. Jane Doe No. 2 was trafficked and sold for sex by traffickers—with the 
knowledge, participation, and aid of Backpage—to men across Massachusetts and Connecticut 
who paid Jane Doe No. 2’s traffickers to rape her.  Jane Doe No. 2 estimates that she was raped 
several thousands of times over the course of three years between the ages of 14 and 17. 
87. Jane Doe No. 2 was first trafficked on Backpage.com in 2013 when she was 14 
years old.  She was sold by a female relative who submitted ads of Jane Doe No. 2 to 
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Backpage.com.  She was later transferred to and sold by male family friends repeatedly until she 
was 17 years old.  These traffickers also submitted ads of Jane Doe No. 2 to Backpage.com.  
88. Over the course of three years, her relative and several associates trafficked Jane 
Doe No. 2 for sex on Backpage.com.  She was typically sold seven days a week, up to eleven 
times per day.  Jane Doe No. 2 was forced to do “in-calls,” where she was raped at her home or 
hotels she was placed in by her traffickers, as well as “out-calls,” where she was raped at locations 
chosen by the men buying her. 
89. Jane Doe No. 2’s traffickers used pre-paid credit cards to pay for the 
advertisements.  The traffickers paid extra to have the advertisements reposted by Backpage.com, 
in order for them to appear at the top of the search page. 
90. Usually Jane Doe No. 2’s traffickers drafted advertisements that included a 
pseudonym, her availability, and phone number.  On a few occasions, the traffickers required Jane 
Doe No. 2 to post advertisements for herself.   
91. The advertisements for Jane Doe No. 2 were posted to Backpage.com from various 
locations in Massachusetts and Connecticut.   
92. Defendants knew Jane Doe No. 2 was being trafficked on Backpage.com.  As 
described in detail in paragraphs 26–55, supra, during all relevant times, Defendants reviewed 
(i.e., “moderated”) every advertisement in the Adult Entertainment section of Backpage.com, 
which included the advertisements featuring Jane Doe No. 2 when she was 14 years old. 
93. Jane Doe No. 2’s traffickers attempted to indicate in advertisements posted on 
Backpage.com that Jane Doe No. 2 was a minor.  Upon information and belief, Backpage 
materially altered the explicit language of these advertisements, removed certain words, and 
redrafted the advertisements to suggest Jane Doe No. 2 was an adult in the advertisements that 
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were ultimately posted on the website.  Upon information and belief, in advertisements for Jane 
Doe No. 2, Backpage deleted words and/or images signaling the involvement of a child through 
the use of its automated filtering software (which included its list of prohibited terms) and/or 
through removal or alteration by its moderators, as is Backpage’s regular practice. 
94. As just one example of this material alteration, Jane Doe No. 2’s trafficker initially 
attempted to include photographs in the advertisements she submitted to Backpage.com that 
showed Jane Doe No. 2’s genitals and face, and which plainly showed to any reasonable person 
that Jane Doe No. 2 was an exploited child.  After these advertisements were submitted to 
Backpage.com, Backpage removed the photographs showing that Jane Doe No. 2 was a child 
from the proposed advertisements, and then allowed the materially altered advertisements to post 
on the website.   
95. Additionally, on information and belief, Backpage also materially altered language 
in the proposed advertisements that signaled that Jane Doe No. 2 was a child, in order to suggest 
that Jane Doe No. 2 was an adult.  
96. On information and belief, Jane Doe No. 2’s relative eventually began modifying 
the posts to conform to Backpage’s stated policies and coaching practices.  More specifically, on 
some occasions she cropped Jane Doe No. 2’s face from the nude photographs and on others used 
photographs of adult females.  Further, knowing that Backpage would and did remove overt 
language that signaled that Jane Doe No. 2 was a minor, the trafficker eventually drafted the 
advertisements without using such words or phrases.  
K.  Defendants participated in trafficking Jane Doe No. 3 on Backpage.com 
when she was a minor. 
97. Jane Doe No. 3 was trafficked and sold for sex by a trafficker—with the 
knowledge, participation, and aid of Backpage—to men across Massachusetts and Florida who 
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paid Jane Doe No. 3’s trafficker to rape her.  Jane Doe No. 3 estimates that she was raped hundreds 
of times over the course of several months. 
98. Jane Doe No. 3 was trafficked on Backpage.com between 2014 and 2016, 
beginning when she was approximately 15 years old.  She was first sold by her ex-boyfriend. 
99. Over the course of several years, her trafficker sold Jane Doe No. 3 for sex on 
Backpage.com.  She was typically sold seven days a week, and up to twelve times a day.  Jane 
Doe No. 3 was forced to do “in-calls,” where she was raped at the hotel she was placed in by her 
traffickers, as well as “out-calls,” where she was raped at locations chosen by the men buying her. 
100. Jane Doe No. 3’s trafficker paid extra to have the advertisements reposted by 
Backpage.com in order for them to appear at the top of the search page. 
101. Defendants knew Jane Doe No. 3 was being trafficked on Backpage.com.  As 
described in detail in paragraphs 26–55, supra, during all relevant times, Defendants reviewed 
(i.e., “moderated”) every advertisement in the Adult Entertainment section of Backpage.com, 
which included the advertisements featuring Jane Doe No. 3 when she was 14 years old. 
102. Jane Doe No. 3’s trafficker attempted to indicate in advertisements posted on 
Backpage.com that Jane Doe No. 3 was a minor.  When the trafficker proposed language that 
plainly communicated that Jane Doe. No. 3 was a child, on information and belief, Backpage 
materially altered the explicit language, removed certain words, and redrafted the advertisement 
to suggest Jane Doe No. 3 was an adult. 
103. Upon information and belief, Backpage deleted words and/or images signaling the 
involvement of a child through the use of its automated filtering software (which included its list 
of prohibited terms) and/or through removal or alteration by its moderators, as is Backpage’s 
regular practice. 
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104. With Backpage’s coaching, Jane Doe No. 3’s trafficker eventually was able to 
identify the specific words and phrases that signaled a child was involved that had caused the 
Defendants to materially alter the advertisement.  Because Jane Doe No. 3’s trafficker wanted to 
advertise the fact that Jane Doe No. 3 was a child for sale, he stopped using explicit language and, 
instead, began to use emojis to communicate that he was selling a child for sex.  This, Backpage 
permitted.  For example, after Backpage blocked the word “girl” or “girls” from appearing in 
advertisements, Jane Doe No. 3’s trafficker would instead use, or instruct Jane Doe No. 3 to use, 
the “girl” emoji. 
105. On information and belief, Defendants fully understood the meaning of the emojis 
and permitted them to be used because they believed that law enforcement could not effectively 
search for emojis, and, even if they could do so, law enforcement were unlikely to understand the 
meaning of the emojis. 
106. Jane Doe No. 3’s trafficker sometimes required Jane Doe No. 3 to write 
advertisements for herself.  Jane Doe No. 3 was instructed to use emojis in her advertisements.  
She used, among others, emojis depicting (i) “make-up” and “nails” to signal to buyers that she 
was a minor, (ii) “girl” to signal that she was a minor, (iii) “peach” to signal that she would allow 
buyers to touch her buttocks, (iv) “water drops” to signal that she would engage in activity that 
involved the exchange of bodily fluids, i.e., sexual activity, (v) “pineapple” to signal the taste of 
her bodily fluids, and (vi) “money bag,” “dollar bills with wings,” or “cherries” to signal that she 
was available for sale. 
107. Jane Doe No. 3’s trafficker frequently included photographs in the advertisements 
that he submitted to Backpage.com, some of which showed Jane Doe No. 3’s bare breasts, 
genitals, and/or face.     
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108. During limited discovery in this action, Backpage produced sixteen4 
advertisements featuring Jane Doe No. 3 that were posted on Backpage.com in 2016, when Jane 
Doe No. 3 was 16 and 17 years old.  “Administrative data” produced by Backpage shows that, of 
these 16 advertisements, Backpage moderators deleted photographs from eight of them (50 
percent).  In four of the 16 advertisements (25 percent), Backpage moderators deleted 
photographs that included at least part of Jane Doe No. 3’s face.  Furthermore, based on Jane Doe 
No. 3’s recollections of photographs that she provided to her trafficker and knowledge of her 
trafficker’s usual practices with respect to preparing advertisements for Backpage.com, Jane Doe 
No. 3 believes that Backpage moderators cropped her face out of photographs in approximately 
half of the advertisements.   
109. The photographs that Backpage moderators deleted from these advertisements 
were not consistent across advertisements (i.e., certain photographs that were deleted from one 
advertisement were not always deleted from other advertisements).  The photographs that 
remained in the posted advertisements often displayed Jane Doe No. 3’s shoulders, legs, buttocks, 
genitals, and/or breasts.  
110. Although Backpage refused to produce any advertisements featuring Jane Doe No. 
3 from 2014 and 2015,5 when Jane Doe No. 3 was 14-16 years old, it is reasonable to infer—as 
Plaintiffs do upon information and belief—that Backpage similarly deleted or cropped out Jane 
                                                 
4 Backpage produced copies of 19 advertisements during limited discovery in this action; of those, 
three did not feature Jane Doe No. 3. 
5 During the limited discovery process in this matter, Backpage conducted a search for 
advertisements featuring Jane Doe No. 3 that encompassed only those advertisements associated 
with a particular email address (provided by Plaintiffs) that was used by Jane Doe No. 3 and her 
trafficker in 2016, and certain phone numbers associated with that email address.  Jane Doe No. 3 
is aware (and made clear to Defendants, including through sworn responses to interrogatories) that 
advertisements featuring her were posted on Backpage.com in 2014 and 2015 using other email 
addresses. 
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Doe No. 3’s face from advertisements submitted to Backpage.com in 2014 and 2015, thereby 
purposely obscuring the fact that Jane Doe No. 3 was a minor being sold for sex.  Such pictures 
would have made clear to any reasonable person that Jane Doe No. 3 was a child.   
CLAIMS FOR RELIEF 
COUNT I 
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, 18 U.S.C. § 1595 
111. The allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 110 are hereby incorporated by 
reference. 
112. Jane Doe No. 1, Jane Doe No. 2, and Jane Doe No. 3 are victims of child sex 
trafficking within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1591 and are entitled to bring a civil action under 
18 U.S.C. § 1595 against any individual or entity whose violations of the TVPRA proximately 
caused Jane Doe No. 1, Jane Doe No. 2, and Jane Doe No. 3 to sustain physical and psychological 
injuries.  
113. The Defendants knowingly benefited financially from participation in illegal child 
sex trafficking ventures in violation of the TVPRA, 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(2), by, inter alia, 
engaging in acts and omissions that were intended to support, facilitate, and further traffickers’ 
marketing, transportation, and sale of child victims for commercial sexual exploitation.   
114. Defendants knew or recklessly disregarded the fact that Jane Doe No. 1, Jane Doe 
No. 2, and Jane Doe No. 3 were minors being trafficked for sex on Backpage.com, and Defendants 
took affirmative steps to decrease the likelihood that law enforcement would be able to detect and 
prevent these trafficking ventures, which in turn increased the number of times Plaintiffs were 
raped by men who bought them on Backpage.com.  
115. Defendants also knew that their efforts to enhance the success of their website 
likely would increase the overall volume of illegal commercial sex online, and that their ability 
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to conceal the incidence of children included among those advertisements would tend to increase 
the number of children sold for sex online.  In this respect, Defendants knowingly benefited from 
participation in the trafficking of children generally on Backpage.com. 
116. Defendants knowingly benefited financially from the daily advertisements that 
successfully sold Jane Doe No. 1, Jane Doe No. 2, and Jane Doe No. 3 for sex, and participated 
in the trafficking ventures that exploited them by the various means described herein.    
117. Jane Doe No. 1, Jane Doe No. 2, and Jane Doe No. 3 have suffered substantial 
physical and psychological injuries, and other damage, as a result of being trafficked through 
Backpage.com. 
COUNT II 
Unfair and Deceptive Practices in Violation of Mass. Gen. Laws c. 93A § 2(a) 
 
118. The allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 110 are hereby incorporated by 
reference.   
119. Defendants are engaged in trade or commerce within the meaning of M.G.L. c. 
93A. 
120. Defendants have committed various knowing and willful unfair and deceptive 
acts and practices proscribed by M.G.L, c. 93A, § 2.  These actions include, but are not limited 
to, doctoring advertisements for illegal commercial sex concerning each Plaintiff, as well as other 
children, in a manner to convey the false impression that the proposed transaction involved an 
adult rather than a child.  These actions extended the time period during which Plaintiffs were 
exploited and thus the number of instances in which each of them was raped.   
121. Jane Doe No. 1, Jane Doe No. 2, and Jane Doe No. 3 have suffered substantial 
physical and psychological injuries, and other damage, as a result of Defendants’ conduct.  
122. Defendants do not have a place of business or maintain assets in 
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Massachusetts. 
PRAYERS FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs seek for judgment against the Defendants: 
a.         The actual and compensatory damages determined to have been suffered by each 
plaintiff; 
 
b.         Punitive damages; 
 
c.         Costs and reasonable attorney’s fees; 
 
d.         Such injunctive relief as the Court deems appropriate; 
 
e.         Such further relief as the Court may deem just and equitable. 
 
The Plaintiffs demand a trial by jury on all issues so triable. 
 
JANE DOE NO. 1, JANE DOE NO. 2,  
and JANE DOE NO. 3 
 
Respectfully submitted, 
 
_/s/ John T. Montgomery____________ 
 
John T. Montgomery (BBO #352220) 
Aaron M. Katz (BBO #662457) 
Jessica L. Soto (BBO #683145) 
Rebecca C. Ellis (BBO #685729) 
Matthew D. LaBrie (BBO #693698) 
ROPES & GRAY LLP 
800 Boylston Street 
Boston, MA 02199 
T: (617) 951-7000 
Email: john.montgomery@ropesgray.com 
aaron.katz@ropesgray.com 
jessica.soto@ropesgray.com 
rebecca.ellis@ropesgray.com 
matthew.labrie@ropesgray.com 
Jolene L. Wang (pro hac vice) 
ROPES & GRAY LLP 
1121 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, NY 10036 
T: (212) 596-9000 
Email: jolene.wang@ropesgray.com 
Dated: April 12, 2018 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 12th day of April, 2018, this document filed through the ECF 
system will be sent electronically to the registered participants as identified on the Notice of 
Electronic Filing (NEF).  I further hereby certify that on the 11th day of April, 2018, exhibits C, 
D, R, and U, which will be filed under seal, were sent separately via encrypted electronic mail to 
the same registered participants. 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ John T. Montgomery 
Dated:  April 12, 2018 John T. Montgomery 
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